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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
H. C. HARGRAVES, Building Inspec-
tor for SALT LAKE CITY, a mu-
nicipal corporation, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARR ... Y L. YOUNG, KENNETH L. 
ANDERSON, and WI L L I AM 
WALKENHORST, Defendants. 
Case No. 8275 
Brief of Defendants and Respondents 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
The three defendants in this case, all of whom are owners 
of homes located in Residential A Districts in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, constructed rigid awnings or patio covers adjacent to 
their homes. In each case the device extends into or across 
the minimum sideyard area as prescribed by Salt Lake City 
Zoning Ordinance in the areas concerned. 
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At the time of the construction, none of the defendants 
secured a building permit from the city because of the gen-
erally accepted view among the fabricators of awnings of 
this type that said awnings not being part of the building 
were not subject to the restrictions. regarding use of sideyards 
for building purposes. After the awnings were completed and 
in place, each of the three defendants was advised by the city 
engineer's office that that office· regarded them as being in 
violation of the ~oning ordinance and suggested that the 
defendants apply to the Zoning Commission for a variance. 
This the defendants did. Their applications for variance were 
denied and the defendants were ordered to remove the awn-
ings. This the defendants declined to do and it was agreed 
between counsel for the defendants and counsel for Salt Lake 
City Corporation that this action should be brought to secure 
a judicial interpretation of the Ordinances in question. 
No question is raised by the City in its pleadings regard-
ing the question of whether or not the defendants should or 
should not have secured a building permit. In the Court below 
the plaintiff likewise made no assertion that the defendants 
should have followed the provisions of Sec. 10-9-15, U.C.A. 
1953. That position was taken by the plaintiff for the first 
time in their Brief in this Court. Counsel for both plaintiff 
and the defendants cooperated before the hearing in the 
District Court to secure a determination of the matter as 
expeditiously- as possible. Accordingly, a stipulation of fact 
was entered into between the parties in which they attempted 
to set forth all the material facts of the case in order to permit 
the matter to be determined upon a Motion for Summary 
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Judgment. The Motion was made by the defendants. After 
extended argument before Judge Ellett, it was ruled that the 
city ordinances respecting sideyard clearance did not apply to 
devices of this type and if in fact they were so interpreted such 
ordinances would be invalid as being beyond the power of the 
City Commission to adopt. 
As is pointed out in the appellant's brief, the case was 
dismissed as to William Walkenhorst. It is, therefore, on 
appeal to this Court only as to the other two defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THIS WAS A PROPER CASE FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Counsel for defendants is somewhat amazed at the position 
taken by the plaintiff in this case that the Motion for Summary 
Judgment made in the court below was not a proper remedy. 
Before the action was commenced, it was agreed between 
counsel that it was desirable to get the case before the Court 
for determination as expeditiously as possible and a Motion 
for Summary Judgment was agreed upon as the proper pro-
cedure to accomplish this result. 
Counsel for the plaintiff cooperated fully with counsel 
for the defendants in stipulating to all material facts so that 
the matter would be in proper condition to permit disposition 
on a Motion. Why the plaintiff has now changed his position, 
we, of course, do not know. However, it appears that the 
grounds upon which he relies for contesting theprocedure 
are not well taken. 
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The plaintff quotes Rule 56 (b) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure to the effect that Summary Judgment may be sought 
only on ((a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim." Without quot-
ing any authority whatsoever, he maintains that this action 
concerns none of the three. The defendants submit to the 
Court that these three terms as used in this section were in-
tended to encompass the entire field of litigation. The term 
((claim" clearly appears to be intended to cover any affirmative 
relief sought by a plaintiff against a defendant. Certainly the 
plaintiff in this case is seeking some relief as against the 
defendants, otherwise he has no standing before a Court. 
R1:1le 8 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure covering gen-
eral rules of pleading speaks of ((original claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim or third party claim." Rule 10 (b) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure speaks of averments in pleadings as naver-
ments of claim or defense." Apparently the plaintiff takes the 
position that the term uclaim" as used in the Summary Judg-
ment rule applies only to a demand for money. This claim is 
without logical or legal support. The term ((claim" is intended 
to apply to any demand for affirmative relief in a complaint. 
Plaintiff also maintains that the provisions of Rule 56 (c) 
were not complied with. They maintain that there were still 
issues as to material facts in the case. We agree there was 
an issue as to whether or not there was any relationship be-
tween the ordinance, if interpreted as the city maintains it 
should be interpreted, and the public health, safety, morals 
or general welfare. However, there were sufficient evidentiary 
facts stipulated to by the parties to permit the court to re-
solve this question of ultimate fact and law. If there were not 
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sufficient facts stipulated to, to permit the court to do this, 
then the fault lies with counsel on both sides because, as 
stated above, counsel got together and attempted to put the 
case in condition that the court could pass upon it on a Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
The defendants could have submitted affidavits as pro-
vided by Rule 56 (c) and the plaintiff could have submitted 
counter-affidavits, however, we attempted to obviate the 
necessity of this by stipulating as to the facts. We stipulated 
as to the location of the structures in question and presented 
to the Court by stipulation photographs from which the size, 
location and character of the structures could be determined. 
Never until the Brief was filed in this court, did counsel for 
the plaintiff mantain that it was necessary to have any testi-
mony of experts as to the density of population, fire hazard, 
health of the population and the efficient movement of traffic. 
The court was in a position to determine all of these matters 
on the basis of the stipulation entered into and in fact many 
of these matters could have no conceivable relationship to the 
particular type of device involved in this action. 
The two cases cited by the plaintiff under this argument 
have no application here. The case of State ex rel. Civello v. 
New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 22 A.L.R. 260, merely 
stands for the proposition that where an ordinance could be 
justified by considerations of public health, safety, comfort 
or the general welfare, the discretion of the municipal counsel 
should not be over-ridden. It does not stand for the proposi-
tion, as the plaintiff seems to imply, that the decision of the 
city governing body on these matters is final. The courts still 
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have the power to review city ordinances to determine whether 
or not the municipal governing body has exceeded its juris. 
diction. 
The case of People v. Leighton, 44 N.Y.S. 2d 779, merely 
holds that evidence rna y be received on the question of the 
reasonableness of a city ordinance. As pointed out above, 
counsel here attempted to present this evidence before the 
court by stipulation and never until this appeal was taken 
did counsel for the plaintiff maintain that the court did not 
have before it all of the evidence necessary to a determination 
of the question. 
B. THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 10-9-15, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 HAVE NO APPLICATION 
TO THIS PROCEDURE. 
Section 10-9-1 to Section 10-9-15, U.C.A., 1953 contain 
provisions for property owners to obtain variances from zon-
ing regulations to permit construction of buildings, which 
without the variance would be in violation of the zoning laws. 
They also provide for a review by the courts of the action 
of the Board of Adjustment on a petition for variance. Those 
provisions have no application here. It is true that in an effort 
to avoid a controversy, the defendants in this case did apply 
for a variance However, the injuntion action of the city was 
not resisted by the defendants on the grounds that the Board 
of Adjustment erred in refusing the variance. The action is 
resisted upon the ground that no variance is necessary because 
the ordinance as adopted does not prohibit these devices. In 
support of our position that the ordinance did not prohibit 
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open and unobstructed by what? The plaintiff admits that 
trees and shrubs may be planted in the yard but implies, with-
out quoting any authority, that these are specifically excepted. 
If there is any specific exception for trees and shrubs in the 
ordinances, we have be~n unable to find it. There are specific 
exceptions made in the zoning ordinance to the sideyard re-
quirement, and all of these exceptions are concerned with 
parts of the house or building on the yard. The conclusion is 
therefore inescapable that when the ordinance requires a 
sideyard open and unobstructed, it means open and unob-
structed from a building or any part thereof. The question 
that must be answered therefore, is: are these structures a part 
of the building so as to come within the provisions of this 
ordinance? 
Section 401 of the Building Code of Salt Lake City de-
fines a building as follows: 
uA building is any structure built for the support, 
shelter and enclosure of persons, animals, chattels 
or movable property of any kind.'' 
It should be noted that the foregoing purposes of a build-
ing are in the conjunctive and not in the disjunctive, and it 
cannot be doubted here that the devices in question provide 
no enclosure of any kind. 
It is uniformly held that zoning ordinances or restrictive 
covenants which curtail the use of property, being in deroga-
tion of a property right, should be strictly construed against 
the restriction. Among recent cases so holding are: 
10 
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Bolhack et al v. Temple Anshe Sholom of Kew Gar-
dens, 56 N.Y.S. (2d) 598 
Johnson et al v. Wellborn, 181 S.W. (2d) 839 
Meyer et al v. Steine, 145 SW (2d) 105 
There is a division of authority as to whether or not 
an open porch which is constructed as an integral part of a 
building is within the provisions of restrictive covenants 
and zoning ordinances so as to prohibit them being constructed 
in sideyards. So far as counsel has been able to determine, 
there are only two cases dealing with rigid awnings or carports 
which, while depending upon the house for part of their 
support, are readily detachable therefrom, and do not form 
an integral part of the building. Both of these cases hold 
that the construction of such rigid awnings or carports in the 
sideyard space does not offend against ordinances or cove-
nants requiring open and unobstructed sideyards. 
Among the cases holding that open porches are not part 
of a building so as to prohibit their construction in open side-
yards, are: 
Brigham v. H. G. Mulcock Co. a New Jersey case, 
70 Atl. 185 
Forsee v. Jackson, a Missouri case, 182 S.W. 783 
Graham v. Hite, a Kentucky case, 20 S.W. 506 
Hames v. Lavor, an Illinois case, 43 N.E. 1076 
Koffman v. Schreiber, a Michigan case, 188 N.W. 333· 
The first case dealing specifically with rigid awnings was 
the New York case of Olcott v. Sheppard Knapp Co., 89 
N.Y.S. 201. The court held that an awning with a glass roof 
and set on poles did not violate the setback requirements. 
11 
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The most recent case in point is the case of French v. 
Cooper, 43 Atl. ( 2d) 880, wherein holding that a rigid awning 
was not part of a building, the Court stated: 
t (The sketch returned with the record discloses that 
the building proper has the necessary setbacks on both 
Atlantic Ave. and North Street and in the absence of 
proof to the contrary, we hold that the awning is not a 
part of the building. There is no evidence that it is 
permanent! y attached to the building and it is at most 
an adjunct thereto. i.e. added but not essentially a part 
thereof. 
ttlt is settled that a municipality has no power to 
limit the use to which property may be put unless the 
regulation is designed to promote public health, safety 
and general welfare. Durkin Lbr. Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 
106 NJL 183, 147 Atl. 555. We fail to see in what 
respect the erection of this awning can adversely affect 
public health, safety or general welfare. The absence 
of a brief on behalf of the respondents suggests that 
they too experience the same quandry. The fact that 
nearby property owners have expressed themselves as 
favoring the proposed ·awning and they have no ob-
jection waives against the reasonableness of the deci-
sion to refuse the permit. Prosecutor is entitled to his 
permit and costs." 
The respondents further maintain that if the ordinance 
were interpreted to prohibit devices of this type in the sideyards 
it would be invalid as beyond the power of the City Commis-
sion to enact. It is fundamental that city governments have 
only those powers granted by the legislature. In regard to the 
power to adopt zoning regulations, Sec. 10-9-1, U.C.A. 1953 
grants this power to the City Commission Hfor the purpose of 
12 
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pr~moting health, safety, morals and the general welfare of 
the community." 
As is pointed out in the case of French v. Cooper above, 
there is no relationship between the promotion of public 
health, safety, morals, and the general welfare and the prohi-
bition of devices sue~ as the ones here concerned. While courts 
are inclined to construe the powers of the city government 
fairly liberally, there is a wealth of cases invalidating zoning 
restrictions because they are not enacted for the purpose of 
protecting the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. 
In the case of Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. Kinglig 
et al, 20 NE ( 2d) 583, a zoning ordinance permitted the main-
tenance of public schools but prohibited private or parochial 
schools in a residential section. The court held that so far as 
the relationship to promotion of public health, safety, morals 
or general welfare, there was no difference between the two 
types of schools and so invalidated the ordinance. 
For other cases invalidating building ordinances on this 
ground see: Zadworny et al v. City of Chicago, 44 N .E. ( 2d) 
426; Bennett v. City of Hope, 161 S.W. (2d) 186; City of 
Corpus Christi et al v. Jones, et al, 144 S.W. (2d) 388; Bran-
don v. Board of Commissioners of Town of Montclair, et al, 
11 Atl. (2d) 304 and Szilvasy v. Saviers et al, 44 N.E. (2d) 
73,2. 
A landmark case in this regard is the U. S. Supreme 
Court case of Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183. 
There, the court in invalidating an ordinance, stated: 
13 
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((The governmental power to interfere by zoning 
regulations with the general rights of the land owner 
by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, 
and other questions aside, such restriction cannot be 
imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to 
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare." 
What possible relationship can there be between pro-
hibiting structures of this type and the public health, safety, 
morals and general welfare? One of the most common grounds 
for upholding zoning ordinances is that they are necessary 
to prevent congestion of the streets. This does not apply here. 
The devices in question are back of the building line. Further-
more, they will not increase the congestion of the area as 
they do not facilitate the residences for additional occupance. 
Another ground for prohibiting a building too close to 
the property line is that such building will prevent the passage 
of light and air. Neither of these apply ·here. The roofs of 
these structures are glass and the sides are free and open, thus 
permitting free passage of light and air. 
The only suggestion which counsel for plaintiff had to 
make in the Court below was that these devices might prevent 
passage of fire fighting equipment between buildings. This 
contention rings rather hollow in view of the fact that it is 
admitted that trees, shrubs and other natural objects which 
would do much more to impede the passage of such equipment 
are permitted. Under the holding of the Catholic Bishop of 
Chicago v. Kinglig case above cited, the city may not prohibit 
one use of an area while permitting another use of a different 
character which is even more detrimental to public safety than 
the use permitted. 
14 
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Certainly there can be no adverse relationship to the 
public health. If anything, these structures would improve the 
public health.Anderson's awning was erected to keep rain and 
easter! y winds from flooding his basement. Young's was erected 
to permit his invalid wife to get in and out of his automobile 
during wet weather. 
What possible relationship can there be to property values 
or genetal welfare? In each instance, as reference to the stipu-
lated exhibits will show, the neighbors of the persons concerned 
filed petitions asking that the devices be left standing and 
stated that they increased rather than impaired values in the 
neighborhood. 
The argument of the plaintiff that this decision would 
open the way to the construction of any type structure in 
sideyards, including carports with concrete roofs, is, of course, 
not well-founded. Each case must stand on its own merits. As 
pointed out above, there is a division of authority as to whether 
or not open porches or car ports which are an integral part 
of the house, must conform to sideyard requirements. How-
ever, there is no division of authority in regard to devices such 
as this, which while they form a valuable adjunct to a house, 
do not become a part thereof and are easily removable. Even 
though the devices may be easily removed, it would, of course, 
be a great financial sacrifice to the land owners in these cases 
if they were compelled to move them because the devices are 
tailored to fit the particular house and could not be used 
elsewhere. However, that fact does not make them part of 
the house any more than a room size rug tailored to fit a 
paritcular room would become part of the real property. 
15 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to the Court that this matter was properly 
decided in the Court below, the court having held that the 
ordinance does not, by its terms, prohibit devices of this type 
and that if it attempted to do so, such ordinance would be in-
valid as having no reasonable relationship to public health, 
safety, morals, or general welfare. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
721 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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